The Fort Worth Press - US Monroe Doctrine Revival Risks Pushing Latin America Toward China

USD -
AED 3.672504
AFN 66.000368
ALL 79.268109
AMD 364.320403
ANG 1.789783
AOA 918.000367
ARS 1512.273804
AUD 1.397233
AWG 1.80125
AZN 1.70397
BAM 1.679281
BBD 2.014502
BDT 123.298316
BGN 1.696366
BHD 0.377107
BIF 2984.660694
BMD 1
BND 1.271197
BOB 11.727937
BRL 5.216804
BSD 1.00021
BTN 95.349267
BWP 13.402252
BYN 3.016542
BYR 19600
BZD 2.011669
CAD 1.39076
CDF 2275.000362
CHF 0.809525
CLF 0.023608
CLP 929.140396
CNY 6.719904
CNH 6.73209
COP 3193.68
CRC 451.378305
CUC 1
CUP 26.5
CVE 94.674074
CZK 20.837304
DJF 177.720393
DKK 6.45406
DOP 58.721252
DZD 133.41304
EGP 50.249704
ERN 15
ETB 163.378683
EUR 0.86348
FJD 2.199804
FKP 0.735368
GBP 0.739104
GEL 2.610391
GGP 0.735368
GHS 11.202459
GIP 0.735368
GMD 74.000355
GNF 8792.114572
GTQ 7.634879
GYD 209.263688
HKD 7.84008
HNL 26.830033
HRK 6.506404
HTG 130.854201
HUF 315.403831
IDR 17764.6
ILS 2.976204
IMP 0.735368
INR 95.59175
IQD 1310.333873
IRR 1374600.000352
ISK 121.410386
JEP 0.735368
JMD 158.543444
JOD 0.70904
JPY 160.170504
KES 129.403801
KGS 87.450384
KHR 4047.567939
KMF 423.00035
KPW 900.000294
KRW 1379.690383
KWD 0.30896
KYD 0.833552
KZT 463.527826
LAK 22430.676896
LBP 89569.786761
LKR 328.019886
LRD 181.040737
LSL 16.001219
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 6.339216
MAD 9.241971
MDL 17.293533
MGA 4314.58243
MKD 52.82251
MMK 2099.772007
MNT 3598.777615
MOP 8.07707
MRU 40.239384
MUR 46.870378
MVR 15.450378
MWK 1734.419206
MXN 17.04682
MYR 4.026204
MZN 63.903729
NAD 16.001082
NGN 1339.230377
NIO 36.809184
NOK 9.386805
NPR 152.558483
NZD 1.692575
OMR 0.384504
PAB 1.00021
PEN 3.351636
PGK 4.43561
PHP 62.368038
PKR 277.48638
PLN 3.74911
PYG 5927.077117
QAR 3.646058
RON 4.539904
RSD 101.286038
RUB 86.146991
RWF 1470.306657
SAR 3.752212
SBD 8.000251
SCR 13.752763
SDG 601.503676
SEK 9.61492
SGD 1.275175
SHP 0.740866
SLE 24.650371
SLL 20969.499227
SOS 571.585577
SRD 37.74037
STD 20697.981008
STN 21.036273
SVC 8.75176
SYP 13001.999906
SZL 15.989284
THB 33.132504
TJS 9.25201
TMT 3.5
TND 2.917491
TOP 2.40776
TRY 48.244804
TTD 6.788276
TWD 31.685504
TZS 2645.003038
UAH 44.565558
UGX 3771.073837
UYU 40.278022
UZS 11819.8093
VES 790.677104
VND 26072.5
VUV 118.040776
WST 2.709953
XAF 563.222427
XAG 0.015017
XAU 0.000224
XCD 2.70255
XCG 1.80268
XDR 0.707052
XOF 563.220009
XPF 102.399423
YER 236.503589
ZAR 16.178804
ZMK 9001.203584
ZMW 18.929211
ZWL 321.999592
  • JRI

    -0.0700

    12.33

    -0.57%

  • RELX

    0.1820

    36.482

    +0.5%

  • BCE

    -0.0300

    23.37

    -0.13%

  • RBGPF

    -0.4400

    70.69

    -0.62%

  • CMSD

    0.0000

    21.18

    0%

  • GSK

    0.4460

    50.716

    +0.88%

  • CMSC

    -0.0500

    21.26

    -0.24%

  • VOD

    0.1250

    16.005

    +0.78%

  • BTI

    -0.1300

    56.15

    -0.23%

  • RIO

    -1.5300

    103.25

    -1.48%

  • BCC

    0.0050

    78.775

    +0.01%

  • RYCEF

    -0.2500

    20.5

    -1.22%

  • AZN

    -1.8400

    162.68

    -1.13%

  • NGG

    -0.1200

    79.31

    -0.15%

  • BP

    -0.3200

    42.02

    -0.76%

US Monroe Doctrine Revival Risks Pushing Latin America Toward China
US Monroe Doctrine Revival Risks Pushing Latin America Toward China

US Monroe Doctrine Revival Risks Pushing Latin America Toward China

The Trump administration’s explicit invocation of the 1823 Monroe doctrine marks a sharp return to 19th-century hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. This aggressive foreign policy approach, characterized by diplomatic threats and visa revocations, is increasingly driving Latin American nations toward China for economic cooperation and critical mineral partnerships essential for the global energy transition.

Text size:

The Trump administration’s recent revival of the 1823 Monroe doctrine signals a decisive shift in United States foreign policy, explicitly asserting American dominance over Latin America and warning against Chinese influence in the region. This renewed emphasis on hemispheric sovereignty has triggered diplomatic friction across South America, raising concerns among analysts that aggressive US tactics are inadvertently pushing regional governments closer to Beijing.

In early August, the US State Department released a five-minute video on social media platforms detailing the Monroe doctrine, describing it as one of the boldest diplomatic statements in American history. The original doctrine was formulated in response to European powers’ attempts to recolonize the Americas, declaring the Western Hemisphere free from imperial conquest and establishing the United States as practically sovereign in the region. The State Department’s modern iteration, narrated by US Ambassador to Panama Kevin Marino Cabrera, frames President Trump as the doctrine’s latest champion.

The administration’s strategy is codified in the White House National Security Strategy published in November 2025, which outlines a goal for a Western Hemisphere free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets. During the document’s unveiling, President Trump declared to the press that American dominance in the region would never be questioned again, attaching a new 21st-century addition he termed the "Trump corollary" or "Donroe doctrine."

This hardline stance contrasts sharply with the approach of previous administrations. Margaret Myers, managing director of Johns Hopkins University’s Institute for America, China and the Future of Global Affairs, noted that the narrative during the Obama era was that benefits to Latin America were inherently beneficial to the United States. That softer approach, which allowed Chinese investment to proliferate across South and Central America, has been consigned to history under Trump.

"You don’t hear that narrative anymore," Myers said. "Now the narrative is that China will take advantage and if you engage too much there will be negative implications."

The administration’s efforts to curb Chinese influence have manifested in direct diplomatic interventions. In June, Chile abandoned plans to lay an undersea cable linking its coast to Shanghai after the US raised concerns that the infrastructure could serve military purposes. In Argentina, a dispute erupted in August when the US embassy in Buenos Aires threatened to revoke visas for executives of an Argentine electricity company following their agreement with Chinese technology firm Huawei. This action occurred despite President Javier Milei being one of Trump’s strongest ideological allies in the region.

Pressure has also intensified around strategic infrastructure. In Panama, where the US retained sovereignty over a buffer zone surrounding the canal until 1999, political tensions rose after the country’s supreme court ruled contracts held by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison to manage ports at either end of the waterway unconstitutional. Trump had previously claimed China was operating the canal, fueling scrutiny over Chinese control of critical transit points.

China has responded angrily to what it describes as coercive diplomacy. In August, Chinese Ambassador to Chile Niu Qingbao accused the US of showing no regard for sovereignty. Chinese officials have emphasized that their overseas development model is based on cooperation and mutual benefit, citing the word "cooperation" 174 times in their most recent Latin America policy document.

Chinese state-linked companies have established a significant foothold in the region’s energy transition sector. The shipping conglomerate COSCO owns a 60 percent stake in the port of Chancay, located 80 kilometers north of Lima, Peru. Chinese firms are also behind lithium mines in Chile and Argentina and are pushing for a transcontinental railway to link these resources.

Alice Hill, a former White House energy adviser and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argued that China’s success stems from its reliability as a partner compared to the US. "It’s a little like a marriage," Hill said. "If your trusted partner has cheated on you, it’s hard to overcome. We [the US] and our word hasn’t proven reliable. We cut off aid and we’ve disparaged our allies."

The geopolitical shift is also evident in trade data. Latin American countries are major producers of critical minerals such as lithium, copper, nickel, and cobon. In 2025, Chile sold more than half of its copper and 70 percent of its lithium to China. Gustavo Pinheiro, an analyst at the energy think-tank E3G, described the energy transition as a "once in a lifetime opportunity" for Latin American development, noting that the technology and expertise are currently concentrated in China.

Diplomatic tensions have escalated further with Brazil. Earlier this month, the visa of Brazil’s ambassador to Washington was revoked as the South American nation approaches its October elections. Meanwhile, Argentina’s economic realities have compelled President Milei to extend a multimillion-dollar currency swap with China, despite his ideological alignment with the White House.

New diplomatic ties continue to form. Last week, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing during a state visit. Analyst Fernanda Magnotta, writing for Americas Quarterly, suggested that Washington’s attempt to force Latin American governments to choose sides is counterproductive. "By trying to make Latin America choose, Washington will teach its governments why they should never have to," she wrote.

Public opinion data supports the view that US influence is waning. Polling published in July by the Pew Research Center indicated that views of China are now more positive in the region than views of the US, with many citizens believing the US interferes in other countries’ affairs. Pinheiro pointed out that the US has a 200-year track record of unreliability as an ally, which is well understood in Latin America.

While the Trump administration links its ousting of Venezuelan President Maduro in January to the country’s oil reserves and frames its actions as necessary for hemispheric security, critics argue that such strong-arming is driving the region away. As international relations analyst Magnotta noted, aggressive US pressure makes alternative partners more appealing rather than less.

The administration’s belief that it can bully allies into submission appears to be misjudged in Latin America, where economic necessity and historical grievances are pushing governments toward Chinese investment and technology partnerships essential for the global energy transition.

L.Rodriguez--TFWP