The Fort Worth Press - Who wins and who loses in Syria?

USD -
AED 3.6725
AFN 65.497294
ALL 79.163542
AMD 364.819005
ANG 1.789783
AOA 918.000211
ARS 1509.519425
AUD 1.398993
AWG 1.795
AZN 1.695737
BAM 1.676086
BBD 2.013404
BDT 122.75417
BGN 1.696366
BHD 0.37692
BIF 2981.509652
BMD 1
BND 1.27037
BOB 11.500754
BRL 5.1567
BSD 0.999636
BTN 95.661079
BWP 13.394468
BYN 2.995445
BYR 19600
BZD 2.01049
CAD 1.38628
CDF 2277.498917
CHF 0.803755
CLF 0.023206
CLP 913.329736
CNY 6.72215
CNH 6.722575
COP 3067.59
CRC 452.93853
CUC 1
CUP 26.5
CVE 94.495578
CZK 20.67145
DJF 178.005356
DKK 6.41443
DOP 58.792021
DZD 133.087965
EGP 50.7903
ERN 15
ETB 163.294924
EUR 0.858097
FJD 2.216401
FKP 0.733696
GBP 0.734055
GEL 2.605046
GGP 0.733696
GHS 11.121109
GIP 0.733696
GMD 74.000474
GNF 8783.665074
GTQ 7.628034
GYD 209.1389
HKD 7.839495
HNL 26.810361
HRK 6.46498
HTG 130.776087
HUF 311.344976
IDR 17737.45
ILS 3.001702
IMP 0.733696
INR 95.705795
IQD 1309.560538
IRR 1374575.000171
ISK 121.000347
JEP 0.733696
JMD 158.148902
JOD 0.709032
JPY 159.312502
KES 129.380164
KGS 87.45011
KHR 4045.831619
KMF 422.999572
KPW 900.000294
KRW 1384.494976
KWD 0.308511
KYD 0.832994
KZT 457.315479
LAK 22458.179076
LBP 89525.413415
LKR 328.799877
LRD 181.432538
LSL 16.021613
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 6.331441
MAD 9.272333
MDL 17.273561
MGA 4303.987316
MKD 52.725847
MMK 2099.770766
MNT 3596.537388
MOP 8.068268
MRU 40.02314
MUR 46.770286
MVR 15.460235
MWK 1733.421893
MXN 16.94965
MYR 4.044098
MZN 63.905013
NAD 16.021682
NGN 1347.359882
NIO 36.790258
NOK 9.31419
NPR 153.055759
NZD 1.679712
OMR 0.384502
PAB 0.999589
PEN 3.356115
PGK 4.498262
PHP 61.69401
PKR 277.382812
PLN 3.69477
PYG 6007.730346
QAR 3.643991
RON 4.507401
RSD 100.649003
RUB 83.852524
RWF 1473.422603
SAR 3.751891
SBD 8.019375
SCR 13.735493
SDG 601.493911
SEK 9.503805
SGD 1.27103
SHP 0.740866
SLE 24.649742
SLL 20969.499227
SOS 571.269416
SRD 37.771498
STD 20697.981008
STN 20.995891
SVC 8.746438
SYP 13001.999906
SZL 16.016969
THB 32.746503
TJS 9.236511
TMT 3.51
TND 2.910753
TOP 2.40776
TRY 48.099103
TTD 6.786502
TWD 31.885499
TZS 2649.998015
UAH 44.714932
UGX 3723.604827
UYU 40.064103
UZS 11815.268065
VES 783.68245
VND 26125
VUV 118.301391
WST 2.715944
XAF 562.148473
XAG 0.014653
XAU 0.000215
XCD 2.70255
XCG 1.801564
XDR 0.707052
XOF 562.148473
XPF 102.204168
YER 237.103241
ZAR 16.01686
ZMK 9001.203248
ZMW 18.968487
ZWL 321.999592
  • BTI

    0.5000

    56.71

    +0.88%

  • AZN

    0.7300

    166.71

    +0.44%

  • RBGPF

    2.5700

    71.13

    +3.61%

  • CMSC

    0.1264

    21.228

    +0.6%

  • BCE

    0.1400

    23.85

    +0.59%

  • CMSD

    0.0800

    21.06

    +0.38%

  • GSK

    -0.6300

    51.78

    -1.22%

  • BCC

    -0.2300

    82.24

    -0.28%

  • NGG

    0.6600

    80.42

    +0.82%

  • RIO

    -0.5000

    104.8

    -0.48%

  • RYCEF

    0.1900

    20.44

    +0.93%

  • VOD

    0.0200

    15.98

    +0.13%

  • RELX

    0.4800

    36.39

    +1.32%

  • JRI

    -0.0100

    12.37

    -0.08%

  • BP

    -1.0200

    43.74

    -2.33%


Who wins and who loses in Syria?




In a dramatic turning point for Syria, the Assad regime has collapsed, paving the way for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to seize the reins of power. This profound shift comes after years of civil war, international intervention, and internal political struggles. While the fall of one government and the rise of another might briefly end large-scale hostilities in certain areas, the implications for Syrians—and regional players—are complex and far-reaching. Below, we examine who stands to benefit from HTS’s ascension and who may face serious setbacks in the aftermath.

Potential Winners

1) Hardline Islamist Groups and Affiliates
As HTS consolidates its influence, other aligned Islamist factions may find opportunities to share in governing structures or expand their influence in regions of Syria. Local militias cooperating with HTS may receive political or financial rewards, as well as a certain degree of autonomy in the territories they help control.

2) Foreign Backers of HTS
Certain external supporters might see political or strategic advantages if their preferred groups are now in charge. These backers could influence the formation of new governmental institutions, policies, or trade agreements favorable to their interests.

3) Some Local Communities Under HTS Control
In areas where HTS had already established local governance—providing basic services and a semblance of stability—residents might see a continuation of order, albeit under strict regulations. While personal freedoms may be curbed, some communities might prefer an end to intense fighting over the chaos of ongoing armed conflict.

Potential Losers

4) Moderate Opposition Groups
Non-extremist factions that fought to topple the Assad regime could be sidelined, if not outright suppressed, by the new leadership. Political competition might be stifled, making it difficult for moderate voices to participate in post-conflict governance.

5) Ethnic and Religious Minorities
With HTS widely considered a hardline faction, minority groups—such as Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze—may face persecution or exclusion from the new power structure. Discriminatory policies could lead to displacement, especially in regions already experiencing sectarian tension.

6) Civil Society and Human Rights Advocates
NGOs, independent journalists, and activists critical of HTS’s ideology may be forced to operate clandestinely or face severe repercussions. Freedom of the press, speech, and assembly could be further curtailed, limiting any meaningful civic engagement.

7) International Humanitarian Efforts
Foreign aid agencies may find it more difficult to operate under a leadership that has been labeled “extremist” by many nations. Bureaucratic hurdles, security risks, and ideological disputes may restrict the distribution of crucial humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations.


International Dynamics

Regional Powers:
Neighboring countries that once supported specific rebel factions might find their influence diminished if those groups lose ground under HTS rule. Conversely, regional actors that developed covert ties with HTS might gain a stronger foothold in Syria’s evolving political landscape.

Global Powers:
Western nations could face a dilemma: accept a de facto extremist-led government for the sake of stability, or maintain sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Rivalries between larger international players—such as the United States, Russia, and Iran—may shift as each decides how (or whether) to engage with HTS.

Humanitarian Concerns:
While HTS’s political agenda may bring an end to certain forms of internal conflict, Syria still faces severe humanitarian challenges. Millions are displaced, infrastructure is in ruins, and the economy remains fragile. Aid agencies worry that severely restrictive policies or ideological conditions set by the new authorities could hamper reconstruction and limit aid distribution, prolonging the suffering of ordinary Syrians.
Looking Ahead

The end of the Assad regime and the rise of HTS marks a new chapter in Syria’s ongoing struggle. For some, the new government provides a semblance of order after years of civil war. For others, it heralds tighter social controls, greater risk of persecution, and an uncertain future. How HTS manages governance, minority rights, and international relations will ultimately shape Syria’s recovery or further turmoil.

As the global community watches from afar, Syrians remain on the front lines of this dramatic power shift—some hoping for a break from ceaseless conflict, others bracing for a new and possibly harsher form of authoritarian rule. Only time will tell if HTS can stabilize the country and address the nation’s myriad challenges, or if Syria’s years of turmoil will persist under a different banner.