The Fort Worth Press - Pakistan’s Taliban dilemma

USD -
AED 3.673015
AFN 64.999782
ALL 80.947117
AMD 360.430183
ANG 1.789785
AOA 917.999777
ARS 1545.671903
AUD 1.456655
AWG 1.8
AZN 1.709472
BAM 1.743549
BBD 2.014201
BDT 124.684633
BGN 1.747831
BHD 0.37715
BIF 3010
BMD 1
BND 1.278494
BOB 11.860357
BRL 5.586302
BSD 1.00008
BTN 93.98513
BWP 13.720001
BYN 2.994357
BYR 19600
BZD 2.011304
CAD 1.41905
CDF 2314.99969
CHF 0.825495
CLF 0.025004
CLP 984.089569
CNY 6.67035
CNH 6.67757
COP 3306.86
CRC 452.34508
CUC 1
CUP 24.001212
CVE 99.225024
CZK 21.81905
DJF 177.719972
DKK 6.69708
DOP 60.701137
DZD 136.512273
EGP 53.322032
ERN 15
ETB 162.77021
EUR 0.89587
FJD 2.26045
FKP 0.745155
GBP 0.74955
GEL 2.59012
GGP 0.745155
GHS 11.710267
GIP 0.745155
GMD 74.000022
GNF 8864.999656
GTQ 7.641802
GYD 209.550384
HKD 7.84545
HNL 26.881572
HRK 6.76901
HTG 131.085575
HUF 326.443002
IDR 18074
ILS 3.18295
IMP 0.745155
INR 93.70695
IQD 1516.057857
IRR 1906075.000314
ISK 122.389884
JEP 0.745155
JMD 158.721951
JOD 0.709026
JPY 158.793987
KES 129.925372
KGS 87.449803
KHR 4080.000134
KMF 438.999811
KPW 899.999961
KRW 1342.419436
KWD 0.31107
KYD 0.833363
KZT 446.483971
LAK 22510.073815
LBP 89553.682465
LKR 332.358631
LRD 169.999198
LSL 16.395017
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 6.410662
MAD 9.755417
MDL 17.970617
MGA 4537.674286
MKD 55.125375
MMK 2099.696522
MNT 3601.450067
MOP 8.080107
MRU 40.350223
MUR 46.919901
MVR 15.409951
MWK 1734.122597
MXN 18.627801
MYR 4.05501
MZN 63.909905
NAD 16.39487
NGN 1348.110245
NIO 36.800956
NOK 9.50823
NPR 150.377549
NZD 1.78494
OMR 0.3845
PAB 1.000071
PEN 3.408278
PGK 4.491377
PHP 63.182013
PKR 276.58297
PLN 3.93845
PYG 6173.609935
QAR 3.645457
RON 4.787198
RSD 105.350071
RUB 83.174285
RWF 1479.602753
SAR 3.760416
SBD 8.097299
SCR 14.027577
SDG 601.504372
SEK 9.87835
SGD 1.282013
SHP 0.744075
SLE 22.949759
SLL 20969.504398
SOS 571.530455
SRD 37.545949
STD 20697.981008
STN 21.841652
SVC 8.750925
SYP 13001.999685
SZL 16.399741
THB 33.629695
TJS 9.190242
TMT 3.51
TND 2.980472
TOP 2.40776
TRY 50.232898
TTD 6.782502
TWD 32.998042
TZS 2643.179814
UAH 45.486291
UGX 4080.286342
UYU 40.464463
UZS 11975.30589
VES 897.18025
VND 25600
VUV 120.001108
WST 2.780103
XAF 587.652118
XAG 0.019414
XAU 0.000248077708
XCD 2.70255
XCG 1.802321
XDR 0.707052
XOF 587.652118
XPF 106.319815
YER 236.496392
ZAR 16.535402
ZMK 9001.199932
ZMW 20.375579
ZWL 321.999592
SSP 5745.814556
MXV 2.093559
  • RIO

    -0.3300

    97.04

    -0.34%

  • CMSC

    -0.0400

    20.67

    -0.19%

  • RELX

    0.0000

    33.41

    0%

  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    67.95

    0%

  • BCE

    -0.0700

    21.99

    -0.32%

  • BCC

    -0.0300

    75.66

    -0.04%

  • GSK

    0.8600

    51.08

    +1.68%

  • JRI

    -0.0300

    11.52

    -0.26%

  • NGG

    -0.1200

    76.68

    -0.16%

  • CMSD

    0.0900

    20.54

    +0.44%

  • BTI

    -0.0800

    55.75

    -0.14%

  • AZN

    2.0200

    168.1

    +1.2%

  • BP

    -1.4200

    43.16

    -3.29%

  • RYCEF

    0.4600

    19.7

    +2.34%

  • VOD

    0.0700

    17.02

    +0.41%


Pakistan’s Taliban dilemma




Pakistan can strike deep inside Afghanistan. Whether it can turn that advantage into lasting security is a different question. Months of fighting have exposed the collapse of its relationship with the Afghan Taliban, but the evidence available in mid-October does not establish that the government in Kabul is approaching its end. A prolonged confrontation remains a more convincing prospect than an imminent change of regime.

The latest exchanges underline how little the underlying dispute has shifted. On 12 October, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar again demanded action against militants operating from Afghan territory. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid rejected Pakistan’s accusations and argued that Islamabad was substituting blame for negotiations. A week earlier, Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi had told talks in Moscow that the differences could be addressed through diplomacy, while defending Afghanistan’s right to respond to attacks. Neither position amounts to an agreed mechanism for preventing the next confrontation.

The human cost is already substantial. Pakistani airstrikes in Helmand and Kunar reported on 1 October killed at least ten civilians and injured nine, according to Afghan officials and the United Nations. Most of those killed were children. Pakistan said it had struck militant facilities and killed 22 fighters; that claim was not independently verified. These competing accounts are a reminder that official battlefield figures require caution, particularly when civilian deaths become part of the struggle over legitimacy.

The confrontation became markedly more dangerous in February, when Pakistani attacks reached Kabul and Kandahar and Defence Minister Khawaja Asif described relations as an open war. Subsequent exchanges, including Afghan drone attacks and further Pakistani airstrikes, widened the conflict beyond isolated frontier incidents. Temporary pauses have interrupted the violence without resolving its cause. The central disagreement remains whether Kabul will dismantle the networks that Pakistan says sustain attacks on its territory.

Those networks cannot be understood by treating every group called Taliban as one organisation. The Afghan Taliban govern Afghanistan. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, usually known as the TTP, is a separate movement fighting the Pakistani state. Its relationship with Afghanistan’s rulers rests on ideological affinities, personal connections and cooperation during earlier wars. Pakistan’s demand is therefore politically more difficult than a request to arrest an unrelated criminal organisation. It asks Kabul to act against militants linked to parts of its own movement’s history.

For Pakistan, this represents the failure of a long-standing strategic assumption. Its support for the Afghan Taliban was expected to produce a friendly government and greater influence in Kabul. Instead, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 was followed by a resurgence of the TTP. Past sponsorship has not delivered dependable control. An Afghan movement that benefited from Pakistani sanctuary now governs a country whose sovereignty it invokes against Pakistani pressure.

Military superiority gives Islamabad considerable destructive power, but no automatic route to a political settlement. Pakistan possesses a modern combat air fleet and substantially larger conventional forces. The Taliban have no comparable fighter capability. That disparity makes bases, equipment and fixed infrastructure vulnerable to attack. It says much less about whether scattered militant networks can be dismantled, whether local commanders will obey an agreement or whether cross-border violence will resume after aircraft return to base.

A campaign intended to weaken the Taliban could also strengthen their political position in particular circumstances. Foreign attacks allow the leadership to present resistance as a defence of Afghanistan, an argument that can reach beyond committed supporters. Civilian casualties may deepen hostility towards Pakistan and make concessions harder to justify internally. This is a strategic risk, not evidence that every Afghan supports the Taliban or that the movement benefits from every escalation.

Kabul nevertheless has vulnerabilities. Unrest in Badakhshan and Herat during 2026 has exposed friction between central authority, local communities and armed opponents. Disputes over mining revenues and the treatment of local leaders show how economic grievances can become security problems. Yet these episodes have remained localised. Armed opposition groups have not demonstrated the capacity for a sustained nationwide challenge, while Islamic State Khorasan remains a threat without becoming a credible replacement government.

The distinction matters when assessing predictions of collapse. A government’s inability to protect its airspace does not establish that it is losing control of its administration or armed forces. A more persuasive warning would be a combination of sustained territorial losses, major defections, disruption of revenue collection and a breakdown in command. Those are the developments that would turn military pressure into an existential crisis. Individual strikes and unverified claims of enemy losses cannot substitute for that assessment.

Pakistan faces constraints of its own. On 11 October, the federal authorities imposed emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and suspended the provincial government led by Imran Khan’s party, citing worsening militancy. The party rejected that justification and described the move as political. Detentions followed. Whatever the competing explanations, the episode demonstrates that insecurity along the Afghan frontier is entangled with a bitter domestic contest over authority. Air operations across the border cannot resolve that contest or replace effective policing and administration at home.

Economic pressure carries similarly uncertain returns. Border restrictions disrupt commercial activity, while the forced return of large numbers of Afghans places additional demands on communities already struggling to provide work and basic services. Such measures can increase the costs of confrontation for Kabul. They can also damage the livelihoods and local cooperation on which durable border security depends. Pressure on a population and pressure on the decisions of its rulers are not interchangeable.

The most plausible route out of repeated escalation remains a security arrangement that both sides can test in practice. That would require specific commitments on militant activity, a functioning channel for investigating incidents and a way to distinguish an unauthorised attack from a deliberate breach by the other government. Earlier mediation by Qatar, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia shows that diplomatic channels exist. Their value will depend on whether they can produce enforceable steps rather than another short pause.

A settlement would still leave difficult questions about the TTP, Afghan sovereignty and the disputed frontier. Nor would diplomatic engagement excuse the Taliban’s restrictions on women and girls or its repression of dissent. Security negotiations address an immediate danger; they do not confer approval on the government involved. Keeping those questions distinct is necessary if civilian protection is to remain an objective rather than a bargaining instrument.

Pakistan’s war has revealed the limits of its former influence in Kabul. It has also exposed the Taliban’s inability to shield Afghanistan from a stronger neighbour. Neither finding establishes that the movement is about to lose power. For now, the more defensible assessment is that both governments possess ways to hurt the other and lack a reliable means of securing the concessions they want. The danger is an enduring conflict in which political control survives while civilian security steadily deteriorates.