The Fort Worth Press - Cuba’s bleak oil crisis

USD -
AED 3.672499
AFN 65.000102
ALL 80.716215
AMD 378.656912
ANG 1.79008
AOA 916.999995
ARS 1444.5061
AUD 1.42104
AWG 1.80125
AZN 1.703701
BAM 1.633386
BBD 2.013103
BDT 122.138616
BGN 1.67937
BHD 0.376968
BIF 2960.735925
BMD 1
BND 1.261227
BOB 6.906746
BRL 5.197202
BSD 0.999495
BTN 91.809686
BWP 13.078391
BYN 2.841896
BYR 19600
BZD 2.010222
CAD 1.35408
CDF 2240.000163
CHF 0.765525
CLF 0.021855
CLP 862.939783
CNY 6.95465
CNH 6.94074
COP 3670.36
CRC 496.072757
CUC 1
CUP 26.5
CVE 92.086637
CZK 20.29245
DJF 177.719931
DKK 6.235745
DOP 62.885991
DZD 129.171921
EGP 46.837506
ERN 15
ETB 155.421337
EUR 0.83513
FJD 2.1911
FKP 0.725629
GBP 0.72366
GEL 2.695061
GGP 0.725629
GHS 10.924686
GIP 0.725629
GMD 73.000235
GNF 8770.633161
GTQ 7.668217
GYD 209.112281
HKD 7.80161
HNL 26.37704
HRK 6.2933
HTG 130.891386
HUF 317.563026
IDR 16741.65
ILS 3.097875
IMP 0.725629
INR 92.04105
IQD 1309.331429
IRR 42125.000158
ISK 120.909983
JEP 0.725629
JMD 156.680488
JOD 0.709025
JPY 153.081999
KES 129.000187
KGS 87.450173
KHR 4017.905611
KMF 412.000074
KPW 899.941848
KRW 1427.75028
KWD 0.30645
KYD 0.832978
KZT 503.603671
LAK 21533.681872
LBP 89506.589387
LKR 309.494281
LRD 184.910514
LSL 15.892551
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 6.276907
MAD 9.037126
MDL 16.761456
MGA 4459.737093
MKD 51.481981
MMK 2099.981308
MNT 3572.641598
MOP 8.032705
MRU 39.899616
MUR 45.090023
MVR 15.460024
MWK 1733.186347
MXN 17.16525
MYR 3.918993
MZN 63.759786
NAD 15.892618
NGN 1394.459919
NIO 36.779996
NOK 9.574604
NPR 146.893491
NZD 1.65069
OMR 0.384496
PAB 0.999516
PEN 3.344329
PGK 4.278419
PHP 58.780105
PKR 279.608654
PLN 3.512035
PYG 6712.014732
QAR 3.634154
RON 4.256097
RSD 98.041985
RUB 76.546829
RWF 1458.255038
SAR 3.750365
SBD 8.077676
SCR 13.753586
SDG 601.498846
SEK 8.82156
SGD 1.261875
SHP 0.750259
SLE 24.303915
SLL 20969.499267
SOS 570.233129
SRD 38.092028
STD 20697.981008
STN 20.460913
SVC 8.745579
SYP 11059.574895
SZL 15.88602
THB 31.139852
TJS 9.34036
TMT 3.5
TND 2.858467
TOP 2.40776
TRY 43.413099
TTD 6.783978
TWD 31.282102
TZS 2560.000284
UAH 42.724642
UGX 3578.571995
UYU 37.82346
UZS 12092.817384
VES 358.47615
VND 26065
VUV 119.671185
WST 2.725359
XAF 547.815484
XAG 0.008493
XAU 0.000182
XCD 2.70255
XCG 1.801312
XDR 0.68021
XOF 547.813197
XPF 99.5983
YER 238.393717
ZAR 15.709905
ZMK 9001.201624
ZMW 19.865039
ZWL 321.999592
  • SCS

    0.0200

    16.14

    +0.12%

  • CMSC

    -0.1000

    23.7

    -0.42%

  • RIO

    0.4600

    93.37

    +0.49%

  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    82.4

    0%

  • BCC

    -0.8900

    80.85

    -1.1%

  • BCE

    -0.2500

    25.27

    -0.99%

  • CMSD

    -0.0457

    24.0508

    -0.19%

  • BTI

    -0.1800

    60.16

    -0.3%

  • RYCEF

    -0.5500

    16.6

    -3.31%

  • JRI

    -0.6900

    12.99

    -5.31%

  • VOD

    0.0700

    14.57

    +0.48%

  • GSK

    -0.7000

    50.1

    -1.4%

  • BP

    0.0800

    37.7

    +0.21%

  • RELX

    -0.9800

    37.38

    -2.62%

  • NGG

    0.3700

    84.68

    +0.44%

  • AZN

    -2.3800

    93.22

    -2.55%


Cuba’s bleak oil crisis




The arrest of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026, and the subsequent pledge by Washington to reroute Venezuela’s oil away from its Caribbean ally, has jolted Havana into a new economic crisis. Cuba’s lifeline to cheap Venezuelan crude has shrivelled; the last tanker from the state oil company PDVSA left Venezuela’s José port in mid‑December and arrived in Havana with its transponder off, carrying about 600,000 barrels. In 2025 Venezuela supplied roughly 26,500 barrels per day, a third of Cuba’s daily needs, while Mexico contributed about 5,000 barrels. After Maduro’s capture, Venezuelan fuel deliveries stopped altogether and U.S. officials declared a virtual blockade on Caracas’ tankers, leaving Cuba with insufficient oil reserves and only modest shipments from Mexico. Energy analyst Jorge Piñón of the University of Texas warned that there is “no light at the end of the tunnel” for Cuba to survive the next few months without Venezuelan oil.

An energy grid in freefall
Cuba’s antiquated, oil‑fired power grid has lurched from crisis to crisis in recent years. A nationwide grid collapse in March 2025 plunged millions into darkness after a transmission line shorted near Havana, forcing a restart of the entire system and leaving both of the island’s main power stations idle. The collapse followed months of rolling blackouts outside the capital that peaked at 20 hours a day, with entire rural areas losing electricity for longer than they had power. Residents resorted to charcoal fires for cooking and scrambled to obtain ice to keep food cold. Cuba’s top electricity official warned that repairs would be slow, while shortages of fuel, medicine, water and food made life “unbearable”.

Blackouts have triggered social unrest. In March 2024, crowds in Santiago de Cuba banged pots and demanded “power and food” when the lights went out at a state‑run market. Residents interviewed by reporters spoke of electricity outages exceeding 10 hours a day. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy publicly acknowledged that shortages of power “provide the spark for any protest”. In November 2024, the government warned that it would not tolerate “public disorder” as scattered demonstrations erupted following another nationwide blackout caused by Hurricane Rafael; prosecutors announced the preventive detention of protesters on charges of assault and vandalism. The state responded by distributing emergency rations and accelerating repairs, but rolling blackouts continue across the country.

Blackouts and sanctions squeeze the economy
Cuba’s economy was already contracting before the current crisis. The pandemic and the near‑total shutdown of tourism caused a 10.9% drop in GDP in 2020, according to international statistics. Minor growth in 2021 and 2022 (1.3% and 1.8%) gave way to a return to recession in 2023–24. The United Nations forecasts a 1.5% decline for 2025, leaving Cuba and Haiti as the only Latin American economies still shrinking. Official statistics show that 11 of the country’s 15 economic sectors are contracting: sugar output is down 68%, fishing 53% and agriculture 52%, while manufacturing has fallen 41%. Export earnings fell by $900 million in 2024 and imports were 18% below forecast. Cuban economists estimate that the economy shrank about 4% in 2024, on top of a 1.9% contraction in 2023.

Blackouts amplify these losses. Economists inside Cuba say that the power crisis has paralysed industry and curtailed transport. Households lose refrigeration; water pumps and medical facilities falter; and businesses without generators lose productive hours. In many provinces, blackouts of 20 hours a day have become routine. A human‑rights blog citing utility reports noted generation shortfalls of 1,300 to 1,700 megawatts, meaning that nearly half of national demand went unmet during peak periods.

The collapse of Venezuelan oil supplies will aggravate this deficit. Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and already imports most of its fuel. PDVSA shipments under the long‑standing “oil for doctors” programme once kept Cuba’s thermoelectric plants running; without them, generation capacity is set to plunge. No other ally is stepping in: energy researcher Piñón notes that Angola, Algeria, Brazil and even Russia have not offered significant support. Mexico’s occasional cargoes of 85,000 barrels are insufficient to “keep the lights on across the island”.

Political strain and regime anxiety
The political ramifications are severe. U.S. President Donald Trump has portrayed the seizure of Maduro as part of a broader crackdown on Latin American regimes. During a January 4 press conference, he said that “Cuba looks like it’s ready to fall”, declaring that the island’s government had no income now that Venezuelan oil was cut off. He threatened further military action against Caracas if the remaining officials did not cooperate, and suggested that Colombia and Mexico could also be targets. Trump’s comments have fuelled speculation about regime change, and have unsettled Cuba’s leadership.

U.S. intelligence reports acknowledge the island’s grim economic state but are ambivalent about whether hardship will topple the government. Confidential assessments described key sectors like agriculture and tourism as “severely strained” by frequent blackouts and trade sanctions. Analysts warned that the loss of oil imports from Venezuela could make governing more difficult. One official said that blackouts outside Havana were lasting an average of 20 hours a day. Yet the assessments concluded that economic suffering does not necessarily translate into regime collapse.

Cuban leaders nevertheless display signs of alarm. President Miguel Díaz‑Canel vowed that “nobody tells us what to do” and pledged to defend the homeland “until the last drop of blood”. The prosecutor’s office warned that it would not tolerate disorder during the blackouts and detained protesters for “assault, public disorder and vandalism”. Energy minister Vicente de la O’Levy admitted that power cuts fuel social tensions. Local officials have rushed to deliver subsidised food to calm restive communities in Santiago and other provinces. Behind the scenes, the government is quietly reassigning fuel supplies, rationing diesel for hospitals and planning emergency imports of floating power plants.

A humanitarian and demographic crisis
The economic implosion is driving an unprecedented exodus. Independent demographers estimate that Cuba’s population has fallen 25% in four years, dropping below nine million as hundreds of thousands migrate annually. A U.S. intelligence official cited by the press suggested that the population is likely under nine million. The loss of younger people erodes the labour force and saps the regime’s support base; an emeritus professor, Richard Feinberg, warns that when people are “really hungry,” they focus on survival rather than politics.

Human development indicators are slipping. The United Nations ranked Cuba 97th in its 2025 human development index, down from 57th in 1990. The energy crisis is battering public health and education. Persistent power cuts of up to 22 hours a day in Santiago de Cuba have undermined hospitals and schools. Diplomats note that Cuba produces less than half of the electricity it needs and argue that “the collapse has already happened”.

Outlook: collapse or endurance?
The fall of Nicolás Maduro removes the central pillar of Cuba’s energy system and intensifies the island’s descent into darkness. Without Venezuelan fuel, Cuba faces longer blackouts, deeper economic contraction and heightened social unrest. Yet history cautions against assuming an imminent regime collapse. The Cuban state retains powerful security services, a one‑party political structure and the ability to ration scarce resources. It has weathered decades of sanctions, the collapse of the Soviet Union and previous “special periods” of hardship.

What is different now is the confluence of crises: an energy grid on the brink, an economy mired in recession, a demographic haemorrhage and the pressure of a hostile U.S. administration. Whether these forces will finally overwhelm the Cuban regime remains uncertain. For ordinary Cubans enduring darkness, ration lines and empty shelves, however, the immediate reality is clear: the fall of Maduro has pushed their country towards its most severe crisis in decades.